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The law, the environment 
and the mosquito
by Martin Polden
The President of the Environmental Law Foundation argues the case 
for legislative action, particularly in the areas of land development 
and corporate governance, in order to protect and preserve our 
environmental heritage.
I n selecting my title I am indebted to Professor Wolfgang Sachs of the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Energy and Environment and his contribution to the 1999 Schumacher 
Lectures. These lectures are an annual feature of the 
Schumacher Society, established in the memory and spirit of Dr 
Fritz Schumacher, whose book, Small is Beautiful, published in the 
early '70s, proved to be the precursor of much modern 
environmental thinking and whose inspiration survives through 
the society's work.
I emphasise this connection, since it is part of my argument 
that the law, and those who make and practice the law, cannot 
approach environmental issues in isolation   as though they were 
simply another finesse of legal or administrative thinking. In 
order that lawyers, as well as legislators and administrators, can 
be truly effective, all need to be alive to the ecological dimension 
and its interplay with the community at large, as well as the 
quality of the inheritance passing to the generations to come.
IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE
Wolfgang Sachs' lecture was directed at the need to address 
fundamentals rather than treat symptoms, the importance of 
effecting positive change and avoiding reliance on risk 
management and systems engineering. He dwelt specifically on 
the far-reaching implications of climate change, emphasising the 
fact that none of us is likely to be immune from its 
consequences. From the perspective of those in the Northern 
Hemisphere, the impact of global warming is thought of as a 
problem for those primarily in the southern regions of a sub- 
tropical nature. It is there that a variety of catastrophes occur, 
whether through increased flooding and the submerging of 
islands at one end of the scale or, at the other, the extremities of 
water shortage and ravages of drought. All that is seen as far 
removed from us: the warmer summers in Britain could even be 
an attraction, no matter that there may be the occasional 
downpour of equatorial-type rain or at other times extended 
periods of water shortage.
The lesson drawn by Wolfgang Sachs, however, is that such a 
seismic change will carry with it the transition of the northern
temperate zone to one more akin to that of the southern and the 
creation of habitat and conditions in Europe hitherto more likely 
to be found in Africa and India. With this will come the prospect 
of insect-born illnesses spreading northwards and, as the 
temperature increases, 'the day of the mosquito' will be said to 
have arrived!
Within that global setting, how we respond to change, the
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manner in which we assess our needs and honour our obligations 
to the coming generations will come into harsh relief. Reactive
O O
steps, because of the very nature of the problem, will be too late; 
it is the proactive approach for which we need to be equipped. 
With that in mind I advance four propositions:
(1) The law is not an end in itself but must be, and be seen to 
be, connected with all aspects of life. To provide an 
effective framework within which environmental 
considerations are suitably provided for, the legislators who 
frame the laws, the judiciary who interpret them and the 
practitioners who are foot soldiers in the front line, must 
recognise and deal with such needs in these holistic terms.
(2) Whereas we in the UK   or rather England, as perhaps we 
should exclude Scotland and Wales with their separate 
planning and administrative processes   alone cannot make 
all the difference we can make some difference and, by 
example, encourage others.
(3) Changes are afoot in standards and proposals coming from 
the European Commission which we should embrace 
willingly and actively now, rather than wait to be dragged 
into an apparently reluctant acceptance of them. We 
should also view the incorporation of the European 
Convention for the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms (ECHR) into our statute law as an 
opportunity, bringing with it, as it does, the experience and 
findings of the European Court of Human Rights.
(4) Finally, it is in our interest   a simple matter of self-interest 
  to recognise the trends, implications, consequences and 
disadvantages of further environmental degradation and 
ensure that effective steps and machinery are in place to 
counter this.
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PRESENT JURISPRUDENTIAL ASSUMPTIONS
Against that background, I start with the proposition that a 
number of legal assumptions and administrative procedures that 
we hold dear appear to be revered more for the length of time 
for which they have survived than for their continuing 
contribution to the effective rule of law and their relevance to 
sustainability. The legal machinery now in place often militates 
against the environmental dimension and, recalling a line from 
the '60s (Marshall McLuhan, I believe), the message can be said 
to be found in the medium through which the law functions. 
This is apparent from the number of institutions we maintain 
and the levels of inbuilt standards and parameters that constitute 
the established, and thereby assumed, norms   which by their 
very nature perpetuate those norms. If we settle for a regulatory 
approach, and an administrative and judicial line which places 
the environmental aspect in a subsidiary role to other matters, 
be they fiscal or the mindset of what the essentials of life in the 
21st century comprise, then that predetermined mechanism, 
the medium through which the environment is governed, conveys 
the message very clearly   namely that environmental concerns 
do not have the degree of priority which government is keen to 
claim. In short the basic assumptions from which we operate 
govern the laws that are ultimately put in place.
We therefore need to look critically at fundamentals and test 
whether, on turning over a number of the bedrocks of ouro
jurisprudential assumptions, they stand the test of time and 
remain as relevant and appropriate now as when they were first 
put in place. In this I would identify within the space available: 
land use and property rights; planning and public law; civil and 
criminal liability with related requirements as to evidence and 
procedure; and finally corporate governance and responsibility.
Land use and property rights
The use of property was historically related to the rights and 
entitlements of estate owners and only subsequently to 
obligations. In many respects the law relating to property 
ownership reflects the social history of England. Establishment 
of any regulatory regime for planning did not warrant legislative 
attention until the beginning of the last century, namely the 
1909 Housing, Town Planning Act. Even that was primarily 
directed towards 'securing proper sanitary conditions' for new 
housing, but it did at least give local authorities power to 
determine how land should best be used.
It was the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 that set the 
standards against which future legislation evolved, continuing 
through the latter half of the 20th century, and by which a 
number of ancillary agencies have arisen. Built into the regime, 
however, is the underlying presumption in favour of development, 
so that that is the norm and limitations or objections are, no 
matter how described, not the norm. The current byword of 
course is sustainable development, as distinct from any old 
development   but it is development nevertheless! That in itself 
may not be objectionable: what is questionable however is the 
authority given into the hands of the Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions to exercise all statutory 
powers other than those delegated to planning authorities, with 
overriding responsibility for land use and transportation, as well 
as adjudicating on planning appeals. The question is whether 
that amalgam of activity is really appropriate to the 2 1 st century,
whether this medium really gives, indeed is capable of giving out, 
the environmental message to which, in principle at least, this 
and the preceding government have expressed commitment.
To have one government department seeking to satisfy all 
demands is not satisfactory. The tension between being 
supportive of development (albeit with the imposition of 
preconditions) on the one hand, and the precautionary argument 
that favours conservation on the other, is very real. The perceived 
short-term gain often masks longer-term disadvantage: the 
benefit accruing to one part of the country for the siting of a 
particular development could well be at the expense of another 
and strains on infrastructure are not always fully anticipated.
INTERPLAY
... the law, and those who make and practice the law; cannot 
approach environmental issues in isolation ... all need to be 
alive to the ecological dimension and its interplay with the 
community at large, as well as the quality of the inheritance 
passing to the generations to come.
The primary resource of this country is in its land, the urban 
as well as rural environment, natural habitats, wildlife such as 
remains, the open countryside, forests, waterways, seas and the 
air we breathe and by which we have our very existence. The 
mantra of 'sustainable development' frequently results in the 
application of tests, which, if not contradictory, are naive at best 
and specious at worst, in an endeavour to bridge the gap 
between what are often fundamental opposites.
A recent European Commission White Paper emphasises the 
need to work by way of steps that are precautionary, 
proportionate and preventive ('the three Ps') and, to complete 
the alliterative process, it re-emphasises the polluter-pays 
principle. It is unrealistic to expect that these aims can be 
fulfilled within the current planning process, imposing as it does 
still further contradictions between the stance taken by the EC 
and how the Department of the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions (DETR) sees its own role. A separate, government- 
funded department, expertly serviced, has at least the prospect 
of ensuring that the 'three Ps' principle is fully explored and 
given the level of significance it warrants. New Zealand has 
established a Department of Conservation as a government- 
resourced agency. Put into effect here, such an agency would 
result in a better balance being seen to be at work, we should 
benefit from a more imaginative use of the doctrines of 
precaution and prevention and have to place less reliance on the 
polluter paying after the event.
An instance of this two-horse riding is in the planning appeals 
process itself. In the main, appeals are handled by an inspector 
appointed by and reporting to the self-same secretary of state. On 
standing back and disengaging from a system that, because of the 
length of time it has been in place takes on an almost theological 
authority, it must be seen as a curiosity, and a strange approach to 
a system that has an inbuilt capacity inevitably to create conflict 
of interest and is emphatically out of step with a concept of 
justice that favours the need for it to be seen to be done.
The DETR is now reviewing ways and means of simplifying 
appeals procedures and thus enabling the process to be speeded
Amicus Curiae Issue 28 June 2000
up: while not directly akin to the government's proposals for 
limiting the right to trial by jury, and the reduction in legal aid, 
the current proposal to limit and reduce the right to public 
enquiries smacks of that philosophical vent. The Treasury ought 
not to be the arbiter on matters of justice. As I shall suggest later 
it would wholly be in keeping with the creation of an 
environmental court system for the Inspectorate to be 
responsible to that authority rather than to a government 
department.
If that proposition is considered overly radical, the next no 
doubt will be seen as a heresy. It relates to the entitlement of 
third parties to appeal against a grant of planning approval. 
Again, it is a curious assumption that a developer should be 
entitled to challenge the finding of a planning authority against a 
refusal, while those who live and have homes in the vicinity and 
are most affected have no right of appeal against an approval 
regarded locally as undesirable. In part this novel approach stems 
from the initial presumption that the primary duty of a planning 
authority is to regulate development rather than to prevent it. 
Supporters of the status quo argue that such a change would 
impede the flow and pace ot development and prove 
unacceptable to the building industry. The Republic of Ireland 
however allows third party appeals   and that in a country where 
over the last decade there has been a huge swell of development. 
According to Professor Malcolm Grant third part)- appeals there 
make up over 40 per cent of all planning appeals and are having 
some slowing effect upon development.
The proposition that the local planning authority may be 
assumed to have taken full account of all local factors and 
priorities in granting its consent to develop and that local people 
therefore can safely leave such matters in its hands is 
unfortunately not supported on the ground. Statistics collected 
over the past eight years by the Environmental Law Foundation 
identify land use issues and dissatisfaction with local planning 
authority decisions as constituting a major number of the 
complaints it handles, accounting for some 40% of referred 
cases to it in the year 1998/99.
The ECHR, as incorporated in the UK's Human Rights Act 
1998, has particular relevance here. Article 2 guarantees life 
while art. 8 specifies 'respect' for private family life and home; 
beyond that, art. 6 relates to a fair trial in 'the determination of 
civil rights'. Whether taken separately or in combination there is 
enough there to support a challenge by local objectors to a 
planning consent on the grounds that it breaches the rights of 
local people to preserve their way of life.
These prospects lead all the more to the conclusion that the 
setting up of environmental courts in the Australian style, or at 
the very least an environmental division of the High Court akin 
to the Company Courts or Family Division, is increasingly 
appropriate. Lord Woolf introduced the possibility in 1991; the 
Labour Party in opposition were in favour and now Professor 
Grant has issued his report to the DETR on similar lines.
Civil and criminal liability
It is well established and accepted that ownership of land 
carries responsibilities. More needs to be made of its obligations 
and limitations as well as rights. The most significant regime 
coming into play as from 1 April 2000 comprises the statutory
guidance relating to land contamination and the various 
mechanisms this has introduced. Again there is a mixture of 
checks and balances, with commercial considerations at one end 
of the scale and the broader community needs and long-term 
implications on the other. The EC perspective on environmental 
liability is the recognition that environmental damage goes 
beyond that of injury to the person or simple, direct property 
damage. The EC proposal incorporates the need for full 
restoration of what has been damaged, while recognising that 
such a possibility does not always exist, either because the 
damage is too far advanced or the responsible parties are without 
funds. If we are serious about preservation and conservation 
then the sites of contamination must have their reinstatement 
funded at state level.
Accompanying the setting of standards and defining of liability 
is the practical matter of the ability of citizens to argue their case 
and seek remedies. This is part of the greater question of access 
to justice, coupled with which is the need to alleviate restrictions 
on legal standing built into our system. As things stand, there is 
an acceptance by the courts that established NGOs such as 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth have a special place in the 
matter of standing. It remains difficult, however, for citizens' 
groups got together to face a particular problem in their own 
locality to be so readily recognised. This is a total incongruity, 
denying the very people most affected, who, having established a 
sensible working group, are unable to have their association seek 
redress through the courts. We have yet to see whether the 
'victim test' expressed in art. 34 of the ECHR, as incorporated 
expressly by HRA, s. 7(7), has the effect of extending the 
standing rights by reason of the 'sufficient interest test'.
The special and distinctive characteristic of the environment is 
that the issues engaged affect not only those of today but those 
many more of tomorrow. That presents a unique legal challenge, 
demonstrating it to be a special case that warrants a dedicated 
forum as well as procedural rules that take full account of this 
fact. On the matter of standing, we should welcome a recent 
decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines whereby 
lawyers instructed by an organisation formed in the name of the 
generations not yet born, but who will inherit the land, were 
approved as representing clients with locus standi and entitled to 
represent the case for those 'clients', even though they were not 
identified or indeed identifiable! This has the making of a testo
case waiting to happen here!
This concept was focused on by the Fourth Ministerial 
Conference in Aarhus, Denmark, in June 1998 (to which the 
UK Government was a signatory). It recommended better 
access to the courts for individuals who can demonstrate an 
interest in the issues in hand, as well as by established NGOs. 
What was not provided for, however, was the cost of 
proceedings, the question of funding and the difficulties local 
people have in arguing their corner in a telling and effective 
manner. The Environmental Law Foundation (ELF), of which I 
am co-founder, has played an important role in this respect. 
Since its formation in January 1992 the charity, through a 
network of practitioners comprising lawyers and other experts, 
has offered support and representation to local community or 
neighbourhood groups in over 1000 cases, providing an initial 
pro bono appraisal and thereafter continuing professional 
support at low legal aid rates of charging. That comprises 1000
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local incidents and problems that might otherwise not have been 
argued or adequately presented.
The seeking for consistency, the insights required and the 
particular nature of these special cases, all point to the 
desirability of establishing separate environmental courts. Even 
without the creation of such institutions, much would be gained
o
if there were 'Woolf Two', in which court procedure was 
specifically re-constituted in cases involving an environmental 
issue. It will necessitate a rethink on the burden of proof, 
enabling a shift requiring the defendant, once a prima facie case 
is established, to demonstrate that the nuisance, negligence or 
damage complained of does not emanate from his/its source. 
This would need to be dealt with in conjunction with a realistic 
approach to the strict causation test, leaning towards the balance 
of probability on the evidence placed before the court. Beyond 
that, the traditional adversarial stance does not always suit issues 
of an environmental nature, where the court should have the 
benefit of its own experts rather than placing experts in 
adversarial contention. It may be that there are tolerances in 
opinion on particular points, but those can be presented as an 
agreed statement of views rather than as conflict between two 
competing parties.
JTHICS AND ECONOMICS
however reluctant the government may be to impose fresh 
latory requirements upon companies and their directors, 
iere is the beginning of a ground swell in favour of corporate 
activity with greater social responsibility By ensuring even- 
handedness through legislative intervention we avoid the risk 
that one company might be disadvantaged by another.
On the matter of reversal of the burden of proof, it is in a way 
a logical extension of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Beyond 
that, art. 8(1) of the ECHR provides for qualified exceptions to 
the right to a home and private life in which interference by the 
state must be shown to be necessary and proportionate. As a 
consequence, the state or public authority has to justify its 
reliance on the exception and has to discharge that obligation as 
a pre-condition of proceeding. In short, the onus in such cases 
is upon the plaintiff or prosecution. It will be noted that whereas 
domestic disputes between private individuals are not directly 
subject to the ECHR, our distinguished Lord Chancellor has 
urged the courts that there should be compatibility between 
methods of dealing with private disputes and those of a public 
law nature.
A further indicator is in the European Commission's 
recommendation for tightening the law in regard to product 
liability by reversal of the burden of proof. Once a prima facie 
case has established that defects exist and damage has been 
suffered, the victim will not be required to establish the causal 
link. It is for the manufacturer to demonstrate that there is a 
non-linkage. Other proposals involve full disclosure of company 
records and procedural points that will ease the path of the 
plaintiff.
This is all very much in keeping with the 1998 Aarhus 
Convention, which presupposes the provision of updated 
environmental information by local authorities and its 
dissemination to the public at large. The implementation of such
requirements as set out in the Freedom of Information Bill, 
however, falls short of this open approach.
Another recommendation published by the European 
Commission at the end of 1998 urges member states to 
introduce minimum criteria for what are described as 
'environmental inspections'. Its aim is to establish in each 
country effective mechanisms for monitoring the performance 
of environmental legislation and to ensure that EC directives are 
being properly implemented. The theme is that all member 
states must (subject to the acceptance of subsidiarity) comply 
with agreed regulations and procedures so that the systems of 
inspection and enforcement will be subject to greater 
harmonisation and be more in evidence. Guidelines are put 
forward for this purpose. The Contaminated Land Guidelines 
issued by the DETR provide for something of this in their 
inspection processes, but a limiting factor is in the resources 
made available for adequate implementation. The UK 
Environment Agency has certain powers but most are of a 
reactive nature rather than following the proactive line contained 
in the EC recommendation.
Throughout, the EC emphasis is on greater participation by 
the community and on the need to ensure that communities 
have access to all relevant information and the opportunity to 
express their views. Against that philosophy we now have the 
situation in which assembly for purposes of protest comes within 
the remit of the criminal law. Whether this is compatible with 
art. 11, ECHR, which deals with freedom of assembly and 
association, doubtless falls to be tested.
It simply does not do to frame laws and preserve a system that 
fly in die face of what is palpably the more enlightened view 
emanating from the EC. The precautionary principle would 
oblige us to take account of the hidden costs involved in 
authorising development or approving industrial processes. 
Those that are hidden often relate to what falls upon the public 
purse or on public health, such as the BSE consequences and the 
GM foods affair. These 'knock-on' effects and clean-up 
processes are simply not brought adequately into account. The 
cost benefit analysis built into the Contaminated Land 
Guidelines is an example of ignoring such matters.
All of these ideas will help reshape issues of liability and the 
means of dealing with pollution and its consequences in its 
various forms.
Corporate governance and responsibility
A further issue is the need to hold the directors and 
management of corporations personally liable where breaches 
involve matters of criminality. Every corporate summons alleging 
breach of regulations should include the board and its managers, 
unless they can demonstrate not only that they were not 
responsible but there were others of an appropriate competence 
dedicated to oversee the matter in hand and that all reasonable 
steps had been taken to establish an appropriate regime. For this 
purpose we need to see a reduction in the legal escape routes 
that a company vehicle may introduce for the avoidance of 
personal ability.
The separate legal identity of companies has undoubtedly 
been of considerable importance in the commercial 
development of this country. Nevertheless, the separation of the
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company entity from its shareholders and the protection of 
limited liability for the conduct of directors has been gradually 
eroded over time, exposing directors to personal pursuit in 
certain instances in matters of a fiscal nature: in cases of 
insolvency or in relation to tax, national insurance and excise 
duty obligations. There is certainly power in the hands of 
regulators now to include directors and managers where there is 
a regulatory breach that triggers criminal charges. While there 
have been many summonses brought against companies, 
however, there are relatively few involving directors and 
managers.
It would serve as a salutary warning to others to take a more 
direct interest and active part in safeguarding and monitoring the 
environmental dimension if the regulators, including the 
Environment Agency, were more assertive in this regard. 
According to the agency, one of the reasons for the relatively few 
personal prosecutions is the difficulty in establishing who among 
the board of directors or the board of management is actually 
responsible. In my view if a company is so run, then the whole 
board must be deemed responsible and suitably dealt with.
There are other aspects to the implications of corporate 
'separateness'. Even before the proliferation of industrial 
globalisation, parent companies situated in one jurisdiction were 
very reasonably setting up subsidiary companies in jurisdictions 
local to wherever the industrial or other activity was engaged. As 
environmental awareness has increased, regulations have come 
into being and standards been applied in the UK and elsewhere 
in the EU which, while binding on the parent companies formed 
and operated within the UK or other parts of the EU, have not 
impacted upon the manner in which subsidiary companies, 
often in third-world countries, are operating. The question is 
before the courts at the moment, namely the extent to which 
third world citizens employed by the local subsidiary of a UK 
company are entitled to seek redress in the UK courts. If one 
accepts the obligation and responsibility for proper management 
of the parent company, it is hard to see why a lesser obligation 
should exist in respect of a subsidiary company, particularly 
where it contributes to the profit of the parent company and 
benefits shareholders by way of improved dividend, as well as 
directors by way of increased salary!
A review has been initiated by the DTI in regard to changes in 
company law, among which directors' duties to shareholders are 
coming under scrutiny, togedier with the question of whether 
these should be qualified to take account of and avoid company 
activities that are to the detriment of the local community or 
others who may be affected by its activities. The principle of 
enlightened shareholder value is being talked of; there are practical 
difficulties of definition and compatibility in resolving these 
matters but the fact that it is seen as a topic for serious debate is 
impressive in itself.
All of this is part of rethinking corporate governance and its 
place in social responsibility. The Friends of the Earth report, 
'Pollution injustice', identified that 90% of the biggest polluting 
factories are in the poorest parts of the country, a fact which 
prompted Charles Secrett, Director of Friends of the Earth, to 
comment that environmental issues are about public health and 
social justice. There are signs that companies are responding to 
the ethical demands of investors and to the recognition that 
providing information on their social and environmentalI o
performance in conjunction with financial results demonstrates 
sound business management within the hierarchy of corporate 
standing.
O
There is also financial pressure from banks and pension funds 
who want to ensure that the operation of a company does not 
result in the accumulation of financial liability. Additionally, 
auditors want to be certain that any failure to insist upon 
reserves or notes on account will not put them at risk of 
subsequent claims in the event of future takeovers, etc. It was 
reported in the Financial Times in January this year that the Ford 
Motor Company has withdrawn from the Global Climate 
Coalition, whose primary purpose is to dispute the risk of global 
warning and resist the imposition of government action to curb 
carbon emissions. Their action follows that of the major 
conglomerates Shell and EP, who have joined the Business 
Environmental Leadership Council in which there are 2 1 large 
companies committed to pressing the American Congress for 
action on carbon emissions.
The interesting point is that the companies themselves see this 
not only as ethical thinking but also as good economics. My 
point is that however reluctant the government may be to 
impose fresh regulatory requirements upon companies and their 
directors, there is the beginning of a ground swell in favour of 
corporate activity with greater social responsibility. By ensuring 
even-handedness through legislative intervention we avoid the 
risk that one company might be disadvantaged by another.
CONCLUSION
Within the space available I have not been able to dwell 
adequately upon the impact of public opinion ('people's power') 
  as demonstrated most dramatically in the last 18 months in the 
attitude towards genetically modified organisms, how market 
forces can be so dramatically affected by public opinion and 
where government policy has failed to keep pace with that 
opinion.
My urging is that rather than being dragged, reluctant and 
protesting, into the 21st century, the legislature should 
voluntarily embrace substantive changes that will aid and support 
environmental sustainability. Sir Crispin Tickell, in a lecture last 
year to the Royal Institute of International Affairs on the 
imperfections of the World Trade Organisation, introduced the 
dictum that:
' ... the economy is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the environment'.
I find this seductive thinking and commend it with the 
complementary thought that the law can be, and should be, the 
handmaiden of environmental protection. I urge the adoption of 
such an approach as an essential motivation within the new 
resolve needed to meet the challenges of this new century. @
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